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The effects of China’s economic expansion on Eastern 
Partnership countries  





This paper aspires to deconstruct China’s policy towards the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries as well as to 
measure and assess China’s impact on political regimes in the region. It places Beijing’s actions in the broader 
context of China’s grand strategy and its policy towards the post-Soviet space and the European Union alike. It 
focuses on the developments in China’s policy after 2009, i.e. following the start of the EaP. The paper scrutinizes 
the evolving relevance of the EaP countries for Beijing, deconstructs long-term Chinese goals towards these 
actors, and identifies key instruments and carriers of foreign policy on the part of Beijing. The study is based on 
a number of semi-structured interviews with representatives of Chinese academia, think tanks and 
administration conducted in 2017. In order to measure the impact of China’s policies on local political regimes, 
the article adopts the theoretical framework of Limited Access Orders (LAOs) and Open Access Orders (OAOs), 
developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), and further refined into a typology by Ademmer, Langbein, 
and Börzel (2018). The empirical analysis leads to the conclusion that due to China’s general foreign policy 
principles, as well as its recognition of Russia’s alleged interests in the region, Beijing does not aspire to alter 
local political regimes. However, in the case of Belarus, the Belarusian comprehensive economic and policy 
cooperation with China within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative is leading to increased economic 
openness and the evolution of Belarus’ LAO towards unbalanced closure. The article argues that China’s 
economic presence in the region brings both challenges and opportunities to the European Union’s policies, 
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The topic of China’s contemporary political and economic relations with former Soviet Union states located in 
Eastern Europe has received relatively little attention in the English-speaking scholarly debate. Available 
summaries of China’s economic expansion in the region, focusing on the rising level on investments and shifting 
trade patterns, primarily cover the pre-2014 period (Rousseau 2012; Iwański 2012). Some attention has been 
given to China’s reactions to the Maidan revolution, with particular focus on the Russia factor (Kuznetsov 2015). 
The current Chinese debate, on the other hand, focuses on new developments in China’s relations with the 
region, conducted within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Particular focus has been put on 
the issues of instruments used to advance the economic cooperation with Belarus (such the joint industrial park), 
as well as possible political risk that Chinese companies expanding to the region could face (Jia 2017; Zhao 2016). 
Chinese authors covering the current state and future prospects of Chinese-Ukrainian economic cooperation 
often point out the obstacles resulting from Ukraine’s domestic instability, as well as geopolitical factors related 
to the war in Donbas (Zhang 2017; Re 2017).   
 
With the existing literature focusing mostly on great power politics, the structure of economic cooperation and 
security issues, more general questions regarding China’s impact on Eastern European countries’ domestic socio-
economic order remain unanswered. What kind of order is preferred and promoted by Beijing? To what extent 
is China willing to shape the domestic situation in Eastern Europe? What instruments does it use to achieve its 
goals? These questions are important not only from the point of view of scholarly debates, but also policymaking, 
particularly for the European Union (EU). The EU’s own policies towards the region, such as the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) initiative, which started in 2009, are aimed at transforming local socio-economic structures 
and supporting economic and political openness (EEAS 2016). The emergence of China as a player in the region, 
particularly in the economic sphere, is a new factor that needs to be taken into account. From the EU 
policymaking perspective, a particular focus should be put on the EaP region, six former Soviet Union states 
located in Eastern Europe and Caucasus.     
 
This article intends to bridge that conceptual gap using the theoretical framework of the Limited Access Order 
(LAO) and Open Access Order (OAO), developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), with a refined hybrid 
regimes typology presented by Ademmer, Langbein, and Börzel (2018). The paper interprets China – itself an 
unbalanced closure LAO – as an actor largely neutral towards LAOs dominant in the EaP region, and points to 
often unintentional support for maintaining these LAOs. The only case where China might be contributing to the 
transformation of an existing LAO by promoting economic openness (using the refined typology, driving it 
towards an unbalanced closure LAO) is Belarus. This is a result of Beijing’s attempts to promote economic reforms 
‘with Chinese characteristics’, with the aim of increasing its own economic presence and establishing Belarus as 
a transit country within the BRI.  
 
The analysis is limited to two selected EaP countries, namely Belarus and Ukraine. Although China’s relations 
with other EaP countries, including the Southern Caucasus, are also developing dynamically (Ögütçü 2015; 
Shahbazov 2017), the analysis of Belarus and Ukraine provides unique insights into several important aspects of 
China’s foreign policy in the region. Before 2014, both countries’ interactions with China were following a similar 
path, with political relations officially upgraded to the strategic partnership level, and with bright prospects for 
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economic cooperation promised by the Chinese leadership1. However, the Maidan revolution and the conflict 
with Russia has shifted the trajectory of Ukraine’s relations with other external actors, namely the EU and Russia, 
impacting its domestic social and economic order, as well as its overall course of foreign policy. As shown below, 
this has heavily affected Ukraine’s relations with China, derailed the economic cooperation, and made it difficult 
for Ukraine to take part in the development of the BRI. During the same period, President Alexander 
Lukashenko’s Belarus maintained the existing status quo, setting the stage for more dynamic interactions with 
China. Therefore, by assessing Beijing’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus, important conclusions can be drawn 
on how the domestic socio-economic order’s evolution interplays with China’s attitudes and actions towards EaP 
countries. 
 
The first part of the study presents a short introduction of the theoretical framework utilized throughout the 
paper and uses it to assess China’s domestic socio-economic order. The second section provides a literature 
review of the contemporary debate on China’s evolving foreign policy. It seeks to identify the key drivers of 
China’s international engagements with regard to the potential of interference in domestic political situation of 
foreign partners. It also locates EaP countries within China’s grand international strategies and provides an 
overview of the key areas of China’s interests, through which it may attempt to shape the domestic orders of 
Belarus and Ukraine. The following two parts deconstruct China’s general goals and specific objectives in these 
countries, based on interviews with Chinese think tank experts and scholars, conducted in Beijing in 2017. The 
article concludes with an overall assessment of the effects of China’s economic and political expansion on the 
social orders in the region, as well as the implications it has on the EU’s policy towards EaP countries.  
 
The study is based on interviews conducted in China during a study visit organized in September 2017 by the 
Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). More than 50 scholars and experts were interviewed, either in the form of 
semi-structured individual interviews or closed seminars (see Appendix). Interviewees were affiliated with 
Chinese governmental think tanks, administration and universities, all of which have been engaged in contact 
with the EaP countries. The assessment of the current state of China’s economic and political expansion in the 
region is based on official trade and investment statistics, specialized reports, press coverage, as well as speeches 
made by countries representatives. 
 
 
2.  China as an Unbalanced Closure LAO – Implications for the EaP Countries 
 
The theoretical framework provided by North et. al. (2009) divides existing and historic societies into two general 
categories of social orders: the LAOs and OAOs. The division is based on several factors, namely ‘how society 
controls violence, the form of its institutions, the nature of its organizations, especially who can form them, and 
the dynamics of its economy’ (North et. al. 2011, p. 2). In LAOs, political violence is controlled by the collusion of 
powerful groups, forming a political system that gives them access to economic rents, such as land rent, natural 
resources royalties or monopoly profits. In OAOs, to the contrary, the monopoly on violence is granted to the 
state. This provides various individuals and organizations with open access to the polity and economy, based on 
constant competition. These two types – along with different sub-types of LAOs – are put on an evolutionary 
continuum. All OAOs were once LAOs, and all LAOs may aspire to become OAOs, granted that they manage to 
                                                          
1 These developments are described in detail in section 4. 
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develop a set of institutional, socio-economic arrangements (North et. al. 2011, p. 3). This process, according to 
the authors, corresponds with the economic development. Reaching the OAO stage is a necessary precondition 
for societies to join the elite club of developed countries. 
 
As Ademmer et al. (2018) point out, the basic LAO/OAO framework fails to grasp the variety in the degree and 
scope of openness among LAO regimes. This is especially evident in case of a group of hybrid regimes that 
emerged after the end of Cold War. The original framework developed by North et al. (2011) indicates a strong 
correlation between economic and political openness, dividing LAOs primarily basing on the state’s monopoly 
over the use of force and the tolerance of alternative organizations within the society.2 Most of the hybrid 
regimes – especially in the post-Soviet space – generally fulfil these criteria. However, they vary profoundly when 
it comes to the degree and scope of economic and political openness, with no immediate correlation between 
those two variables. For example, both Armenia and Moldova can be classified as LAOs, but the former is seen 
as economically open and politically closed, while the latter holds competitive elections yet has an economy that 
is effectively controlled by an oligarchy (Ademmer et al. 2018) 
 
Basing on the analysis of the post-Soviet space, the authors present a refined typology of LAO regimes, with a 
matrix covering different degrees of economic and political openness (ibid.). The four LAO sub-categories include: 
balanced closure (with a limited access of actors outside of the leading coalition to both economic and political 
spheres); unbalanced closure (with a certain degree of economic openness but restricted political access); 
unbalanced openness (with relatively high degree of democracy, but restricted economic access); balanced 
openness (with substantial economic and political access in relative terms, but not a full OAO).  
 
As this article aspires to measure the impact of China on local political regimes in the Eastern Partnership region, 
the question of a potential transformation of LAO regimes in response to an engagement with foreign powers 
becomes a key theoretical challenge. The enhanced LAO/OAO framework presented by Ademmer et. al. (ibid.) 
focuses on the internal dynamics of LAO regimes, with no close examination of the potential transformative 
effect of foreign encounters. However, the presented LAO type matrix, formed of two axes of political and 
economic openness, can be arguably used to better understand this kind of impact. In the economic sense, 
international cooperation can potentially move a LAO towards a more balanced or unbalanced state, depending 
on the effect on the economy’s internal competition level, the regulatory framework and barriers for doing 
business. In terms of politics, interaction with a foreign power can either reinforce the current leading autocratic 
coalition, thus fostering a closure of a LAO, or promote political pluralism and openness.  
 
It can be expected that an encounter with a foreign power – implying an asymmetrical relation with an entity 
much more powerful politically and economically – will move the LAO in a direction closer to the foreign power’s 
own internal political regime type. That is, for a balanced closure LAO contacts with an unbalanced openness LAO 
(or OAO, for that matter) will promote more openness both economically and politically. However, such a result 
should by no means be considered as automatic. The eventual result of any contacts of that kind can be also 
affected by both parties’ (and especially foreign power’s) foreign policy goals and principles, the actual real-life 
dynamics of the international dialogue, economic cooperation potential, as well as the potential interference of 
                                                          
2 LAOs are divided into fragile (with no state monopoly on the use of force), basic (with state’s full control over 
most aspects of the society), and mature (with the state tolerating alternative organizations) (North et. al. 2011).  
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other actors. In particular, the potential transformative effect is closely related to the willingness of the foreign 
power to shape the political regimes of their partners, as well as the sophistication of tools employed to reach 
that goal. In other words, the theoretical transformative process is limited by a number of additional factors that 
need to be scrutinized empirically. 
 
In order to determine the potential impact of China on the LAO regimes of EaP countries, a brief overview of 
China’s regime type is needed. China has been described by the authors of the original LAO/OAO framework as 
a mature LAO (North et. al. 2011). China’s current political system supports a large variety of organizations (such 
as companies) outside the state, though each needs to receive a special permit from the state. This is particularly 
visible in the economic sphere. China’s robust private sector, developing spectacularly since the beginning of 
1980s thanks to economic reforms, has already outgrown the state-owned economy (Lardy 2014). This was 
accompanied by an intensive competition between state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which was induced and 
encouraged by China’s economic reformers to boost their efficiency and productivity (Kroeber 2016). Thirty years 
of economic reforms have produced a complex institutional system that supports and facilitates economic 
development, based on a mix of state intervention and market competition. It is guided and governed by an 
extensive economic bureaucracy. Even though access to the polity is still limited by the Communist Party of China, 
which controls the majority of economic rents, the political system has developed a set of written and unwritten 
rules, defining the distribution of rents and helping to resolve the conflicts arising from it (Shih 2008). This unique 
set of institutional arrangements, forming a LAO ‘with Chinese characteristics’, is the endowment that China 
brings to the outside world.  
 
However, despite the economic openness, China’s regime is based on extreme restrictions in the political sphere. 
Although formally China holds competitive elections and so-called democratic opposition parties exist3, the 
political realm is strictly monopolized by the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Lawrence and Martin 2013). By all 
the measures and indicators used by the refined LAO framework authors to determine the degree of political 
openness, China is a highly restrictive regime. It holds no free nor fair elections, as virtually all vital political and 
bureaucratic posts are assigned by the CPC. The horizontal accountability, although practiced to some degree 
within the CPC, is not open to other societal actors. With no formal division between legislative, executive and 
judicial power, and full CPC control over the parliament (National People’s Congress), societal actors outside of 
the ruling coalition have no political rights, and the civic rights are also severely limited due to the lack of 
independent oversight. Therefore, as suggested by the secondary literature review presented above, China 
should be considered as an unbalanced closure LAO, to use the terminology of Ademmer et al. (2018), as the 
relatively wide degree of economic access is coupled with far-reaching restrictiveness in the political sphere.   
 
As the extensive analysis of Post-Soviet LAOs conducted by Ademmer et. al. (2018) indicates, Belarus should be 
considered as a model example of a balanced closure LAO, while Ukraine is a balanced openness LAO. In other 
words, Lukashenko’s regime heavily restricts both the political and economic spheres, while Ukraine is relatively 
open politically and economically (although other constraints limiting its evolution towards an OAO are still in 
place). The degree of regime openness largely determines the potential type of impact China’s actions might 
have on these two LAO regimes. For Belarus, an encounter with China may mean a push for more economic 
openness, with no significant change in the political sphere expected (as both entities are closure LAOs). For 
                                                          
3 Eight officially registered democratic opposition parties are de facto controlled by Chinese Communist Party. 
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Ukraine, being a relatively open regime both politically and economically, an encounter with China may 
potentially imply a support for political closure. 
 
China’s impact on the EaP countries’ domestic social orders, however, is dependent on Beijing’s general foreign 
policy goals and own willingness to shape EaP countries’ internal distribution of power and rents. Due to 
numerous reasons, as shown in the following sections, currently China shows no ambition to change the political 
status quo in Belarus and Ukraine. Although it is grounded in China’s long-term foreign policy principles, an 
interference of an external actor – Russia – also plays a significant role in this respect. Beijing’s increasing 
economic presence in EaP countries involves a number of China’s internal actors such as SOEs, private companies 
and economic bureaucracy. This leads to formal and informal interactions, currently visible at an early stage in 
Belarus, which are slowly inducing more competition and openness in local economy.  
 
 
3.  Guiding Principles of China’s Foreign Policy and the EaP 
 
China’s policy towards the EaP countries cannot be separated from the general pattern of Beijing’s foreign policy. 
The guiding principles provide a framework within which specific goals and approaches towards EaP countries 
are formulated and implemented. As this section argues, two defining features of China’s foreign policy – the 
primacy of domestic politics, as well as the non-interference principle linked with China’s self-image – generally 
limits China’s ambitions to alter the degree of local political openness. On the other hand, China’s economic 
interests and growing activeness in the field of global economic governance may push it to change the local 
status quo with regard to economic openness.  
 
3.1.  The primacy of domestic politics 
 
The starting point is that China’s grand strategy – assuming there is one – remains deeply embedded in domestic 
politics. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prioritizes keeping political power and maintaining legitimacy 
among the elites and the general population alike. The modernization and on-going transformation of Chinese 
politics, economy and society are to a significant extent driven by the CCP’s desire to stay in power. Foreign policy 
is subordinated to these domestic factors and serves as a means of providing a conducive international 
environment for domestic reforms and strengthening the Party’s internal legitimacy. The effective protection of 
sovereignty, understood as non-interference in Chinese domestic politics, and of territorial integrity were 
regarded as main sources of the CCP’s legitimacy related to the realm of foreign policy. The rise of China as a 
great power added a new dimension – China’s great power has emerged as an additional source of the Party’s 
domestic legitimacy and the way to respond to growing nationalism (Rozman 2012; Shambaugh 2013b). 
 
The origins of post-Cold War Chinese foreign policy can be traced back to the beginning of the era of ‘reform and 
opening’ (gaige kaifang) in the late 1970s. Following the death of Mao Zedong, China’s new leadership decided 
to drop the revolutionary agenda that had dominated foreign policy since the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949. Deng Xiaoping, a new leader, transformed foreign policy so that it matched the domestic agenda 
of far-reaching reforms. Deng’s formula for Chinese foreign policy envisioned a focus on providing and 
contributing to an international environment that would be conducive to domestic reforms. A phrase ascribed 
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to Deng but which was actually co-opted by Jiang Zemin states that China should: "bide its time, hide its 
brightness, not seek leadership, but do certain things" (Shambaugh 2013b: 18-19). This encapsulated China’s 
determination to keep a low international profile for the sake of domestic transformation. Foreign economic 
expansion served economic growth and thus provided the backbone of the CCP’s continuance of power 
(Shambaugh 2013b). 
 
In the 2000s, China did significantly open itself up to the world and involved itself in multilateral cooperation 
with its neighbours within ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. At the same time, Chinese leaders 
did not betray evidence of any particular ambitions in the international arena. This meant that China remained 
outside of political and military alliances; had no interest in global leadership; gave priority to relationships with 
the United States; held the conviction that it would not become a superpower; and cherished the view that 
diplomacy is mainly intended to serve economic purposes (Xu and Du 2015; Zhang 2015; Ding 2009). Beijing 
pursued its foreign policy mostly along bilateral lines, focusing on building economic ties, opening foreign 
markets to its exports and importing technology. 
 
3.2. A two-stage change of China’s foreign policy  
 
While these basic principles have dominated Chinese foreign policy since the late-1970s and remained relatively 
constant during the period of China’s rise in the 2000s, the 2008-09 economic crisis generated incremental 
change. The global economic crisis of 2008-2009 turned out to be a game-changer for the Chinese elites and their 
foreign policy. China emerged as the foremost trading state and the largest economy, second only to the United 
States (US). The ruling elite’s self-confidence increased along with the Chinese economy, having weathered the 
global crisis like no other major economy. The Chinese ruling elite became more confident, began to view the 
United States as a ‘declining power’, and identified a strategic opportunity to improve the standing of China’s 
international status. The 2011 Libyan crisis – with China forced to evacuate more than thirty thousand of its 
citizens – illustrated the global scope of China’s economic interests and the growing tensions between China’s 
low profile in international politics and its skyrocketing position in the global economy. At the same time, the 
Chinese foreign policy decision-making process became more and more de-centralized, with the growing 
influence of powerful domestic players, from the military to state-owned entities and private companies 
(Jakobson and Knox 2010; Hameriri 2016).  
 
The increased assertiveness towards its neighbourhood and its major counterpart, the US, marked China’s 
relations with the wider world in the aftermath of the global economic crisis. The fact that China weathered the 
economic crisis relatively painlessly boosted the self-confidence of its elite and opened a rift around the question 
of what should be the relevant approach to the outside world. The greatest tension has been between support 
for the continuation of Deng’s low-international-profile course and support for assertiveness on the regional and 
global scene. There were clear indications that the low-profile policy was waning. The period of 2009-10 resulted 
in a marked rise in its assertiveness. At that time, some experts raised doubts as to the scope of changes in 
China’s foreign policy, claiming that there was no qualitative shift, just a more pronounced defence of interests 
that China had declared long ago (Johnston 2013). The overall perception was, however, that a certain line was 
crossed in 2009-10 and China significantly reversed the gains it had secured, particularly in its neighbourhood, 
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by pursuing the previous policy of a benign rising power. The image of China in its neighbourhood suffered and 
it began experiencing difficulties in relations with a number of its neighbours (Zhang 2016). 
 
Under these circumstances, the selection of Xi Jinping as China’s leader in 2012 resulted in further shifts in China’s 
foreign policy. China’s external behaviour has become more assertive, while the decision-making process has 
been re-centralized. Since his coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has shifted China’s approach towards 
international politics. Xi, boosted by the expectations of the CCP and rising nationalist feelings among the general 
populace, decided to abandon the policy of limited involvement in international affairs. The new leader, Xi 
Jinping, has made this assertive stance an abiding feature of China’s foreign policy. Beijing decided to push for a 
rearrangement of the East Asian regional order, particularly by pursuing its claims in both the East China and 
South China Seas, regardless of the harm it could bring to its international image. The catchphrases of a ‘Chinese 
dream’ (zhongguo meng) and the ‘rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation’, put forward by Xi Jinping in 2013, 
have pointed at growing self-confidence and the desire to play a bigger role in international affairs.  
 
A fundamental change took place in the first five-year term of Xi’s rule as China’s leader (Friedberg 2015; Mikheev 
et al. 2014; Deng 2015). Xi Jinping has largely centralized power in his hands, abandoning the formula of 
‘collective leadership’ (Economy 2018). In concert with this, he has redefined the content and the style of Chinese 
foreign policy. The vision devised by Xi clearly differs from that of the ‘low-profile’ policy and opens a new phase 
in the development of China’s relations with the outside world. According to Yan Xuetong, one of the most 
publicly engaged experts in international relations, in terms of policy, "maintaining a low profile" has been 
replaced with "striving for achievements", and diplomacy, which formerly served economic purposes, has been 
supplanted by the strategic goal of renewing the Chinese nation (quoted in: Xu and Du 2015). The slogans of the 
Chinese Dream and of the ‘rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation’ are seen as tantamount to the intention to 
transform China into a superpower similar to the US. China is increasingly open to the idea of leading others, 
instead of merely reacting to developments. The voices calling for the abandonment of another long-standing 
principle – staying outside of political-military alliances, began to emerge in the Chinese debate on international 
politics. The most obvious candidate for an alliance has been Russia (Yan 2015), which is of particular importance 
for China’s policy towards the EaP countries, given Moscow’s ambitions and interests towards these states. 
However, numerous scholars see the existing differences between Russia and China, for instance with regard to 
economic globalization, as a serious obstacle to forging such an alliance (Kaczmarski 2015; Lo 2017). 
 
Beijing pursued its territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas, including the establishment of the 
Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the former and the construction of artificial islands in the latter. China 
has begun to proactively approach its neighbourhood, first and foremost by promoting the concept of the New 
Silk Road (later renamed by China to the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI). The initially vague concept of the BRI 
has evolved into the centrepiece of China’s foreign policy. It represents the attempt to combine China-led 
development of infrastructure between China and Europe with political rearrangement of Central and South-
East Asia. The BRI also serves as a strategic narrative that aims at convincing the world of China’s benign 
intentions, which is a recurring theme of China’s official discourse aimed at the outside world (Xinhua 2017). 
Beijing has also promoted multilateral institutions in the economic sphere, the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS Development Bank, and security in Asia in the form of the Conference on Interaction 
and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), all of which would parallel the existing Western-dominated 
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institutions. Active diplomacy at the highest level has become a trademark of Xi era foreign policy. During five 
years of his rule, Xi has visited several dozen states. In 2015-16 the world witnessed an unprecedented economic 
expansion in Chinese foreign investment, whose level in 2015 exceeded the level of investment carried out in 
China. However, China’s oversears financial expansion in non-strategic sectors was then partially curbed in 2017 
by the central government, concerned with huge capital outflows and depleting currency reserves. Nevertheless, 
China’s economic interests have become genuinely globalized.4 
 
A more robust foreign policy appeared, albeit unaccompanied by a clear vision of what kind of power China 
would like to be, or what kind of leadership it would aspire to exercise, regionally or globally (Shambaugh 2013b). 
The 19th Congress of the CCP that took place in October 2017 brought some clarity. Having consolidated his 
personal power and having reinforced the CCP’s control over particular segments of societal life, Xi Jinping vowed 
to transform China into a global power. This signalled China’s readiness to engage more actively in the shaping 
of global international politics and in the processes of global governance, especially in economic terms. The 
‘abdication’ of the US from the global leadership, observed since Donald Trump’s election in late 2016, pushed 
the Chinese elite’s ambitions even further. From the perspective of this paper, China’s growing ambitions and 
capabilities increase the relevance of China’s policy towards the EaP countries. 
 
3.3. China’s image of self and of the world 
 
Pride at the scale of China’s rise and the successful response to the global economic crisis raised the question of 
the self-perception of China’s elites, not only as a great power but also as a future superpower. Traditionally, 
China saw itself as the centre, surrounded by peripheries that should be subordinate to it. As a result, the 
willingness to convince the periphery of China’s benign intentions competes with the historical legacy of the 
Middle Kingdom’s superiority and the division of the world between Chinese civilization and external barbarians. 
This traditional outlook, in turn, influences China’s approach towards the outside world. However, there are 
several competing identities that shape the contemporary Chinese foreign policy, therefore China’s current 
national identity and the vision of its place in the world comprise contradictory elements (e.g. Shambaugh 
2013b).  
 
On the one hand, the Chinese political and intellectual elites see their country as a distinct civilization with the 
most impressive history in the world. Following the uninterrupted rise during the last three and a half decades, 
the Chinese elite increasingly sees its state as a reborn Great Power. On the other hand, the very same elite 
continues to identify China as a developing country that does not hide the feelings of a century long humiliation, 
suffered at the hands of the West/Europe, including the US and Tsarist Russia/former Soviet Union. Although 
revolutionary ideas were discarded along with Deng’s overarching pragmatism, anti-hegemonism, directed 
against the West, remains an important element of China’s identity. While Marxist-Leninism and socialism with 
Chinese characteristics remain the ideological cornerstone, they have been gradually supplemented by 
Confucianism and references to China’s imperial history (Shambaugh 2013a; Denisov 2015). Nevertheless, 
China’s revolutionary legacy of non-interference and anti-hegemonism still guides its foreign policy towards the 
developing world. 
                                                          
4 For the current data on China’s investments abroad, see China Global Investment Tracker 
http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.  
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3.4. The role of domestic players in China’s foreign policy 
 
While China’s policy towards the EaP countries reflects the guidelines and features of the Chinese foreign policy 
in general, it needs to be remembered that the range of actors, capable of influencing China’s external behaviour 
and partaking in international activities to pursue their particular interests, has significantly risen for the last two 
decades. When it comes to foreign policy directions that are of lesser strategic significance, as used to be the 
case for the EaP countries, the role of specific domestic actors is larger than average. Although most of the 
existing literature on this subject focuses on China’s economic expansion in Africa and Asia, it can be assumed 
that in case of the EaP region (a region of lesser importance for the Chinese decision makers) the Chinese 
leadership’s oversight over these aspects of foreign policy remains similarly scarce, which opens room for 
particular domestic players to shape it (Jones and Zou 2017; Jakobson and Knox 2010).  
 
The changes that have been taking place in China since the early 1990s empowered a broad spectrum of new 
corporate actors (Jakobson and Knox 2010). This is particularly visible in the realm of foreign economic policy. 
The most relevant players that are able to pursue their specific interests, include: state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), particularly those tasked with supplying energy or natural resources, such as the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec or the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC); big private 
business, often with links to the CCP; and certain provinces. The number of bureaucratic players, engaged in the 
conduct of foreign policy, has increased as well and comprises: central administration branches, especially those 
responsible for economic relations, such as the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance and the National 
Development and Reform Commission; provincial governments, which are held responsible for the economic 
development of their respective territories. Even the external security policy saw a rise in potential players, apart 
from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially those tasked with maritime policies, such as the Coast Guard, 
Fisheries Administration and General Customs Administration.  
 
Also, the intellectual community has gained in importance, with think tanks being increasingly included in the 
foreign-policy making process (Shambaugh 2002; Cheng Li 2017).  
 
The CCP’s leadership’s hold on power over China’s foreign policy gradually weakened and was replaced by the 
triangle of the party, the military and big companies. All these actors were able to pursue their own parochial 
interests, not necessarily in line with Beijing’s foreign policy. Only the arrival of Xi Jinping to power in 2012 
reversed some of these trends (Lanteigne 2016: 7-8; Economy 2018). Xi Jinping aspired towards limiting the 
freedom of manoeuvre enjoyed by particular actors and re-centralizing the decision-making process. In 2013, a 
new institution, the National Security Council, was created with the explicit aim of increasing the coherence of 
foreign policy. This was then followed by the establishment of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission at the CPC 
Central Committee, reinforcing party’s direct control over diplomatic bureaucracy, as well as the new China 
International Development Agency (CIDCA) designed to coordinate China’s internal actors involved in the foreign 
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3.5. The bottom line: the primacy of domestic politics 
 
Regardless of these changes, domestic politics continues to prevail over foreign policy. The latter serves the goals 
of domestic economic development since this development remains the fundamental source of legitimacy for 
the CCP. The primacy of domestic politics and the belief that foreign security and economic policy is subordinated 
to domestic purposes cannot be overstated. It remains closely related to the constant fear China’s leaders have 
of a ‘domestic disorder caused by foreign threats’ (Wilson 2009). Extensive use of China’s economic resources 
abroad, which marked Xi Jinping’s grand outward looking projects, has sparked a heated debate within China’s 
intellectual circles. Critics are pointing out potential risks for China’s financial system, possible neglect of internal 
developmental needs, and overextension of foreign policy.5 The global scope of China’s interests, primarily 
economic, as witnessed in the present decade, has been accompanied by a combination of self-confidence and 
uncertainty, with fears of outside intervention in Chinese domestic affairs and an unwillingness to take up 
leadership. 
 
The primacy of domestic politics translates directly into both goals and specific objectives of China’s foreign policy 
towards EaP countries. As domestic economic development remains crucial to the CCP’s internal legitimacy, 
economic cooperation aimed at supporting China’s own economic growth became a priority in its policy towards 
Eastern Europe. On a level of specific objectives, this process is largely driven by China’s internal economic actors, 
such as SOEs and big private companies. With Beijing’s increasing confidence in the international sphere, its 
interests are now bundled in a form of grand international initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. The 
geographic position of the Eastern Partnership countries in Eastern Europe and Caucasus, situated along the 
trans-Eurasian transport corridors that are crucial for the initiative, brought new dynamism into China’s relations 
with the region. BRI opened a new channel of political cooperation between China and the EaP countries. It also 
increased the significance of a China’s new potential partners’ internal political stability, important due to China’s 
general preference for government-to-government contacts. As a consequence, China’s ambitions regarding the 
shaping of internal economic orders of EaP LAOs – although still limited by its inward-looking orientation – are 
now driven by a wider array of actors. China is also using a much more sophisticated set of tools, ranging from 
bilateral cooperation to grand initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative.  
 
Chinese political elites’ anti-hegemonist identity and their own anxiety regarding regime change translates into 
political support for Eastern European autocracies. It also shapes China’s views on Western external actors' 
presence in the region. Although Beijing has no interest to promote increased political openness in LAOs (and 
could actually oppose it), its focus on economic issues generally limits its ambitions to fully support Eastern 
European regimes. Moreover, China displays no immediate ambition to shape the regional security landscape or 







                                                          
5 Authors’ interview with expert in Beijing, September 2017. 
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3. China’s long-term goals towards EaP countries 
 
China’s fundamental goals towards EaP countries represent a mixture of its general approach to the external 
world and a specific approach to these states as part of the former Soviet Union. From Beijing’s perspective, EaP 
countries do not differ significantly from other countries, especially in the developing world, and they remain 
relatively low on the list of China’s foreign policy priorities.6 China aims at securing recognition of its political and 
strategic interests, which might be reflected in the support for the Chinese position in both bilateral dialogue and 
in international forums. In terms of economic foreign policy, China aims at gaining access to particular countries’ 
markets, selected resources and technologies, and exporting its financial and productive overcapacity. Since 
2013, this is conducted within the framework of BRI. At the same time, in formulating its fundamental goals 
towards EaP countries, China has taken into consideration the position of its primary strategic partner, Russia. 
While Russia’s policy towards the EaP countries has evolved, Moscow continues to regard these states as 
belonging to its sphere of privileged interests. 
 
The security/stability goals of China in the EaP comprise two elements: the stability of transit states through 
which the BRI traverses, Belarus in particular, and the maintenance of regional stability, understood in terms of 
EaP countries maintaining their relative independence from Russia. Russia’s domination tends to result in 
domestic backlash, thus leading to instability. Utilitarian goals dominate China’s approach to Ukraine and Belarus, 
including the opening of their markets to Chinese exports and investments (in infrastructure in particular), the 
supply of agricultural and military technology, and maintaining a transit corridor to the EU. China does not display 
particular interest in the EaP countries’ energy sector, which can be partially attributed to Beijing’s recognition 
of Russia’s primacy in this sphere.  
 
In terms of value/identity goals, China by default supports autocracies due to its belief in the principle of non-
interference in domestic affairs. Thus, China could be termed a conservative power by default, opposing 
revolutionary domestic change in particular. At the same time, relatively good political relations with Ukraine 
following the Maidan Revolution illustrate that the democracy-autocracy factor is of secondary importance for 
the government in Beijing. In the case of EaP countries, China appears ready to reconcile itself with any domestic 
political evolution as long as it does not threaten Chinese economic interests directly. 
 
For the last two to three years, two contradictory trends have been shaping China’s policy towards EaP countries, 
influencing the ways in which China has defined its fundamental goals towards the region. On the one hand, the 
relevance of their stability and relative independence has substantially increased for Beijing in the aftermath of 
the proclamation of the BRI in 2013. On the other hand, China’s close relations with Russia and the dominant 
interpretation of Western policy in terms of extending the Western sphere of influence to EaP countries – which 
in itself is similar to the Russian position, make China more reluctant to provide political support to EaP countries. 
 
3.1. The Russian factor in China’s policy towards the Eastern Partnership states 
 
The most relevant question for assessing China’s policy and long-term goals towards EaP countries (Ukraine and 
Belarus in particular) is to what extent Chinese policy-makers and the intellectual elite deem these states to 
                                                          
6 Authors’ interview with expert in Beijing, September 2017. 
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belong to Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’. China’s attitude towards Russian ambitions in the post-Soviet area marks 
a line which Beijing may be unwilling to cross. 
 
On a declaratory level, China rejects any form of 'great power domination over smaller states, promoting equality 
in international politics and cherishing the principle of non-interference. Neither in policy documents single-
authored by Beijing, nor in joint communications signed with Moscow, has China endorsed the ‘special interests’ 
of Russia in the post-Soviet space. In practice, however, Beijing policy has been more nuanced. 
 
China’s reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its underhand intervention in Eastern Ukraine illustrates 
the limitations of Beijing’s political engagement in the region. Both cases left Chinese policymakers feeling uneasy 
and complicated their foreign policy-making (Gabuev 2016; Lo 2017). China has carefully avoided a for-or-against 
choice and preferred not to air its opinions. It did not support Russia openly, nor did it condemn its actions. The 
Chinese representatives abstained from voting in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. China 
repeatedly declared support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity but it adopted a much more nuanced position 
concerning Crimea. Beijing explained its lack of condemnation for Russian actions referring to specific historic 
circumstances. Following this line, China has not joined Western sanctions against Russia. Formally, however, 
China never recognized Crimea’s annexation by Russia.  
 
Among the factors which pushed China to challenge Russia on the latter’s policy towards Ukraine is its fear of 
separatism, which Beijing considers its most serious challenge. Moreover, the form of Russia’s support for 
Crimean separatism – a declaration by its inhabitants expressed in a referendum – might create a precedent 
potentially detrimental to China’s core interests. It thus seems implausible that China would change its policy 
and formally accept Crimea’s annexation by Russia (Gabuev 2015, 2016; Kaczmarski 2015; Lo 2017). 
 
In the case of Belarus, the Russian factor appears to play a much less relevant role for Beijing. This may be 
ascribed to Russia’s developed political-economic ties with Belarus, including the Eurasian Economic Union, and 
the relative lack of fear on the part of the Russian elite that external actors might be able to detach Minsk from 
Moscow.    
 
3.2. Support for the ‘balancing strategy’ in the Eastern Partnership countries 
 
In tandem with this, there are aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that prevented China from supporting 
the new Ukrainian government openly. Chinese scholars and analysts as well as the official Chinese media tended 
to interpret the Maidan revolution in terms of a Western-led conspiracy which overthrew the legal government, 
in a way similar to the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in the post-Soviet space in the mid-2000s. This relates to the 
sensitivity of Chinese authorities to possible and imagined challenges to the CCP’s monopoly on power. Beijing 
blamed external forces for such protests as in Tibet in 2008, Xinjiang in 2009 or in Hong Kong in 2014. In the case 
of Ukraine, the success of a democratic and popular protest does not bode well for China’s ruling party. Seen in 
this light, Russia’s intervention in Crimea was deemed a ‘proper response’ to Western subversion. Consequently, 
China might have implicitly supported such methods (Kaczmarski 2015). 
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Such an interpretation of recent events in Ukraine has influenced China’s official and semi-official discourse on 
EU’s role in Maidan revolution. Many Chinese experts and scholars are critical about the EU’s policy regarding 
EaP countries, especially towards Ukraine and Belarus7. In their views, the EU agenda towards neighbouring 
countries was an attempt to attract Ukraine to the Western political and economic order, forcing it to resign 
from the former ‘balancing’ strategy. Chinese experts regarded the EU’s activity in the EaP region as an attempt 
to comprehensively transform not only political and economic systems, but also the national identity of EaP 
societies. However, the EU is believed to have lacked the appropriate political and economic resources to achieve 
these goals. This led to a failure of the EU’s policy – a perception shared by many Chinese experts within 
governmental think tanks. Some experts have also placed the blame on the political elites of EaP countries for 
ignoring the geopolitical situation, and Russian interests in the post-Soviet area in particular8.  
 
From the Chinese viewpoint, EaP countries should then attempt to diversify their foreign partners in the 
economic sphere while retaining a ‘balanced’ approach in terms of political and security policy, not leaning too 
much towards either the West or Russia. Apart from the arguable acknowledgment of Russian interests in Eastern 
Europe, it also comes from China’s own critical stance towards political regime change and democratization, 
induced and supported by external actors, particularly the West. As one Chinese expert pointed out, the EU has 
encountered – and largely ignored – a lack of ‘internal willingness’ within EaP countries themselves to pursue to 
European course and regime change. This reinforces the hypothesis – derived earlier from the general trends of 
China’s foreign policy – that Beijing has no immediate ambition to increase the political openness within the 
Eastern European LAO regimes.  
 
China seeks to find a middle way in its policy towards the EaP countries. It endeavours to avoid giving Russia a 
carte blanche for its actions in the EaP countries, i.e. by helping them maintain their relative independence from 
Russia. For this purpose, China is willing to conclude ‘strategic partnership’ agreements, which in the language 
of Chinese diplomacy can be considered as a commitment for a closer political cooperation. It also provides EaP 
governments with economic support, particularly financing that is needed for their financial stability. However, 
what the EaP countries have to offer remains limited from Beijing’s point of view and China remains unwilling to 
challenge Russia openly. Moreover, China’s stance towards some of the developments in the EaP region, such as 
pro-democratic policies of the EU, is shaped by its Beijing’s long standing opposition to foreign (and especially 
Western) interference in domestic affairs. Those two factors limit China’s commitment to supporting Ukraine, 
but are not significant in case of cooperation with Belarus, thus differentiating China’s approach to the two 
countries.  
 
3.3. Economic cooperation with EaP countries: the BRI as a game-changer  
 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, cooperation with the now EaP countries fitted in with China's global economic 
expansion and its search for ways to diversify export markets. China’s interest in EaP economies did not differ 
from a general pattern of engagement with developing countries. The economic goals are in line with a typical 
pattern: the promotion of Chinese exports, access to technologies and resources (imports of mineral products 
                                                          
7 Authors’ interview with expert in Beijing, September 2017. 
8 Ibid. 
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from Belarus, agriculture and land-lease in Ukraine), and the location of capital surplus (loans with government 
guarantees). 
 
The major difference when compared with China’s goals towards other EaP countries has been access to former 
Soviet military technology that ‘upgraded’ Ukraine in the eyes of the Chinese government. The continuous 
Western embargo on arms and dual technology exports to China has been a serious obstacle for China’s military 
modernization. Ukraine has been more open to China’s demand than Russia, which, after a fruitful decade of 
cooperation, decided to limit sales of modern military technologies to China in the mid 2000s. The Russian 
government accused China of illegal copying of its products, while the military reclassified China as a potential 
threat. Meanwhile, cooperation with Ukraine provided Beijing with the opportunity to partially bypass Russia. It 
is, however, no longer the case. Sino-Russian arms trade revived in the early-2010s and reached a new peak 
when Moscow agreed to sell two major weapons systems to China, fighter jets Su-35 and anti-missile systems S-
400 in 2015. The participation of the PLA troops in the Vostok-2018 military drills has symbolically confirmed the 
decreasing threat perception of China on the part of the Kremlin. 
 
This basic catalogue of China’s economic interests towards EaP countries remains in place, however, it was 
greatly expanded with the initiation of the Belt and Road Initiative. Xi Jinping put forward the idea of renewing 
the ancient Silk Road during a visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013 (Jin 2015; Larin and Matveev 2015; Vorob’ev 
2014). China’s leader vowed to create the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’, the land-based part of BRI, as the first step 
in the process of connecting China to Europe via Central Asia. Belarus and Ukraine gained in importance as transit 
through their territory offered the shortest transport route from China to the EU. It has not automatically 
translated into an increased political significance for the EaP countries, as the EU-China freight train project is 
only one element of China’s grand project. The political and infrastructural components of the BRI remain 
focused on Asia rather than other regions.  
 
3.4 Regional factors and China’s general policy goals towards Ukraine and Belarus 
 
China’s long-term goals towards EaP countries are generally shaped by the domestic factors, resulting in Beijing’s 
focus on expanding market access, securing resources and facilitating investments. Since 2013, these activities 
have been conducted within the BRI framework, adding a significant transportation component to China’s goals 
towards the region. In terms of politics, China generally advocates for a ‘balancing strategy’ for both Belarus and 
Ukraine, supporting it through economic and political means, to a degree that is consistent with the general low 
priority of Eastern Europe in China’s foreign policy goals. This initial set of goals determines Beijing’s policy 
orientation in its cooperation with both countries.  
 
However, on the level of actual implementation, China’s approach is heavily influenced by two additional factors, 
linked with the EU’s and Russia’s presence in the region: the general opposition to any kind of Western influence 
(resulting from its own domestic challenges), as well as tacit acknowledgment of Russia’s alleged ‘sphere of 
influence’ and the reluctance to challenge Moscow openly. This differentiates China’s approaches to Ukraine and 
Belarus. Beijing is eager to criticize Kyiv’s pro-European orientation and its departure from the pre-2014 
‘balancing strategy’, but is much less vocal when it comes to Belarus’ dependence on Russia. However, by 
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providing economic resources and political support to Lukashenko’s regime, it implicitly supports Belarus’s own 
‘balancing’ acts. 
 
From the point of view of implementing China’s grand BRI strategy, an uninterrupted flow of goods from China 
to the EU through Belarus and Ukraine remains crucial. Belarus is also increasingly important as a ‘testing ground’ 
for a more long-term feature of the BRI, namely a complex structural alignment of local economies with the 
Chinese economic powerhouse, conducted through close economic policy coordination. However, this kind of 
comprehensive policy dialogue is, since the Maidan revolution, not present on the Chinese agenda for Ukraine. 
This can be attributed to a number of factors. Belarus’s centralized political system and a high degree of state 
involvement in the economy, much closer to China’s own domestic environment than Ukraine’s makes it easier 
for China to conduct policy coordination with Belarus on the bureaucratic level. China’s attitude towards 
Ukraine’s participation in the BRI (and particularly EU-China railway transport) is also highly influenced by Russian 
aggression in Eastern Ukraine, as elaborated on in the following chapter.  
 
 
4. Objectives (policies and instruments) 
 
The political instruments that China has been using towards EaP countries include standard forms of political 
support: the conclusion of ‘strategic partnership’ agreements and the establishment of high-level contacts9. This 
enables China to maintain a regular policy dialogue and push forward its economic agenda. Economic tools, in 
turn, comprise credit lines with state guarantees and infrastructure investments.  
 
In its approach towards the EaP countries China prefers bilateral over multilateral relations. This stands in stark 
contrast to China’s policy towards the Central European states, where China put forward the multilateral 
framework ‘16+1’ which it has subsequently attempted to institutionalize. China has not decided to officially 
include any of the EaP countries into the ‘16+1’ format. However, due to Latvia’s diplomatic efforts, Belarus has 
received observer status within the format. During the 2016 Riga summit, Belarus’s prime minister joined the 
annual leaders’ conference and conducted a bilateral meeting with China’s prime minister, Li Keqiang. This 
slightly multilateral turn in China’s approach can be attributed to the development of the BRI initiative, which 
requires comprehensive cross-border coordination on connectivity issues.10 The BRI itself, with the first Belt and 
Road International Forum held in Beijing in 2017, serves as a venue for increased contacts between China and 
EaP countries, particularly Belarus, which – from the point of view of Chinese experts – is one of the most 




                                                          
9 Since the early 2000s, ‘strategic partnerships’ became China’s standard foreign policy tool, with more than 70 
such agreements signed worldwide. There are three basic levels of those agreements, namely a ‘partnership’, 
‘strategic partnership’ and a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. Ukraine signed a ‘strategic partnership’ 
agreement with China in 2011, while Chinese-Belarus ties were raised to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ 
in 2013, and then symbolically upgraded to “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Featuring Mutual Trust and 
Win-Win Cooperation” in 2016, underlining Belarus’s importance in China’s foreign policy (see Struver 2015). 
10 Authors’ interview with expert in Beijing, September 2017. 
11 Ibid. 
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4.1. Facilitating trade and investment 
 
On the level of specific economic objectives, China’s economic policy towards Ukraine is focused on trade, 
especially the import of raw materials and food.12 On the other hand, Beijing’s engagement with Belarus is more 
oriented at investment and financing. This can be attributed partially to the natural endowments of these two 
economies, but is also a result of their internal political situation. Initially, China’s economic offer – in form of 
credit lines and investments memorandums – was presented to both states (with Alexander Lukashenko and 
Victor Yanukovych as local counterparts) before 2013. However, after the Maidan revolution and the Russian 
aggression towards Ukraine, most of the Chinese investment projects in Ukraine have derailed and never 
materialized. This is due to Ukraine’s internal instability, which discourages Chinese domestic economic actors, 
partial acknowledgment of Russia’s policy of sanctions, as well as Beijing’s negative perception of the West’s 
political influence in Ukraine. Throughout the years, China has adapted to the new political reality and unfolded 
a new economic agenda towards Ukraine. However, China’s approach towards Ukraine has shifted from a 
comprehensive cooperation formula, as projected during the late-Yanukovych rule, towards more targeted and 
less risky forms of engagement, such as securing the supply of resources and acquiring military technologies. An 
unimpeded political dialogue with Belarus, on the other hand, has resulted in a more institutionalized and 
consistent dialogue on investments and infrastructure financing. 
 
Ukraine remains an important source of raw materials for China, as well as a valuable partner in Beijing’s quest 
of securing the food supply. In 2015, Ukraine was the biggest supplier of raw corn to China. According to statistics 
for 2015, China was the fourth largest export destination for Ukraine (after the EU, Russia and Turkey), and the 
third largest import partner (after the EU and Russia) (World Trade Organization 2017). Ukraine’s main exports 
to China are natural resources, including ores (32.5 % of all exports in 2016), cereals (29.9 %), as well as fats of 
animal and vegetable origin (26 %) (World Trade Organization 2017). China wishes to maintain this structure of 
trade, with most of Chinese investments proposed after 2013 being aimed at infrastructure dedicated for grain 
exports (Brooke 2018). 
 
Additionally, access to military technology from Ukraine is of particular importance to China. In 1998 the Chinese 
Navy purchased an empty hulk of a former Ukrainian aircraft carrier, which in 2012 was commissioned as China’s 
first aircraft carrier. The aircraft for the ship were manufactured in China on the basis of unlicensed Su-33 jets, 
purchased from Ukraine in 2004, despite Russia’s protests (Office of the Secretary of Defence 2011). In 2009, 
China purchased the Zubr class hovercrafts, once again bypassing Russian objections. However, cooperation in 
this field was hampered after 2014. There are some signals that Ukraine is willing to cooperate with China in the 
nuclear energy sector. In September 2017, a Ukrainian senior officials declared that there is a particular interest 
in the establishment of a joint venture that would be devoted to the production of nuclear fuel in Ukraine. 
However, no details have been revealed as of yet (Skrypach 2017). 
 
Even though China occasionally expresses interest in investing in infrastructure in Ukraine, no concrete 
agreements have yet been concluded. In 2010, a USD 4 billion credit line was established for Ukraine, but its use 
remains limited. Another agreement with a credit line of USD 3.65 billion was signed in December 2012. The 
Ukrainian media has also reported about China’s interest in leasing three million hectares of land in Ukraine, but 
                                                          
12 Authors’ interview with expert in Beijing, September 2017. 
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the deal has not been finalized. China and Ukraine concluded an agreement on joint production of the An-225, 
the biggest transport aircraft in the world, but its implementation has not commenced. The major Chinese 
investment in Ukraine is solar energy generation (10 solar power plants, 267 MW capacity). Many agreements 
that were signed recently, particularly the package of measures concluded during the visit of Viktor Yanukovych 
to Beijing in December 2013, are not being implemented at present. More recent projects, discussed during 
Chinese vice-premier Ma Kai’s visit to Kyiv in 2017, are yet to materialize (Brooke 2018). 
 
Unlike Ukraine, Belarus has developed an advanced and long-lasting political dialogue with China, and the 
economic cooperation has moved to a more institutionalized stage. Belarus became an important testing ground 
for China’s foreign economic policy, with a Chinese expert comparing it to Pakistan in this regard13. The major 
instrument founded to facilitate greenfield investments is the industrial park called “Great Stone”, worth up to 
USD 3 billion. The initial agreement was signed in 2010 and the actual work began in 2014. China has provided 
Minsk with significant loans and credit lines. The first credit agreement between the Belarusian government and 
the Chinese EximBank totalled 5.7 billion USD and was signed in 2009. The second one, between the Belarusian 
government and China Development Bank, was signed in 2010 for USD 8.3 billion. Currently both governments 
are negotiating the opening of another credit line. 
 
The establishment of the ‘Great Stone’ industrial park in 2014, which is currently the most sophisticated of all 
such facilities established by China in Eurasia, broadly follows a more general pattern of China’s economic 
relations with the developing world. Using a coordinated approach, combining special economic zones, credit 
lines and so-called industrial capacity cooperation, China endeavours to transform local economies, thus aligning 
them with China’s own development path and economic interests. China is openly comparing the ‘Great Stone’ 
industrial park with the industrial park in Suzhou, built jointly with China and Singapore, which is generally 
regarded as a great success of a bureaucratic know-how transfer (Halgreen and Ghiasy, 2017). A transfer of 
governance practices and China’s own development experiences, described as ‘integration of development 
strategies’ during Alyaksandr Lukashenko’s meeting with Chinese prime minister Li Keqiang in 2016, also forms 
part of this process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2016). The Chinese side intends 
to formalize such talks through establishment of joint development-related research institutes with Belarus 
(expert interview in Beijing, 2017).  
 
Although the overall value of Chinese projects announced to be realized in Belarus was estimated at around 20 
billion USD, mainly in the forms of loans and limited direct investment, in practice it was much lower. According 
to Chinese estimates, the total amount of China’s capital involvement in Belarus was around 1 billion USD in 
2012-2017 (Shibkovskaya 2017). According to China’s official statistics, in 2015 the total stock of Chinese foreign 
direct investment in Belarus amounted to 475.9 million USD (while Russia’s engagement amounted to almost 4.9 
billion USD) (China Statistics Press 2015).14 Compared to bold announcements, the actual level of investment is 
still relatively modest. However, it should be noted that both countries have managed to boost bilateral 
economic ties significantly over the last five years. In 2012 the total stock of Chinese foreign direct investments 
                                                          
13 Authors’ interview with expert in Beijing, September 2017. 
14 Due to imperfect methodology, official statistics may underreport actual investment flows. However, they 
provide some insights into the general dynamics of China’s OFDI. 
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in Belarus was only 77 million USD; in 2011 there were only 27 Chinese companies operating in Belarus. By 2016 
this number had grown to 191.   
 
4.2. EaP countries on China’s Eurasian transit routes 
 
The EU-China freight train project, or CR Express (zhongou banlie), is an increasingly important element of the 
BRI. It is aimed at developing regular cargo train connections linking the EU and China, suitable mainly for high 
value-added goods. To date, about 50 regular connections linking dozens of Chinese and European cities have 
been established. The project’s medium-term development plan was published by China’s NDRC in 2015 (NDRC 
2015). So far, the actual cargo flows are limited, with 150,000 containers (less than 1 % of overall EU-China trade) 
being transported in 2016. However, train connections have gained high political importance for China’s 
government, serving as a symbol of the Belt and Road Initiative, a useful diplomatic tool, as well as a ‘gateway’ 
to Europe for China’s less-developed inland provinces. 
 
While initially China considered both Belarus and Ukraine as the most convenient transit routes to Western 
Europe, the 2014 Russian-Ukrainian war has significantly changed the environment in which China has been 
pursuing its initiative. Russia’s trade war with Ukraine, which in 2015 resulted in a complete halt of freight train 
connections between the two states, has shut down any possibility of the transit via Ukraine and has made 
Belarus the most important transit route. The Russian annexation of Crimea jeopardized China’s plans to acquire 
and significantly develop a deep-sea port in Sevastopol. The potential advantage of Ukraine serving as both land 
and sea transport hub was then significantly reduced.15  
 
From the point of view of key major Chinese internal actors involved in the development of Europe-China freight 
train connections, Ukraine’s political instability and unfavourable business environment pose too much risk to 
use it as a transit route for the foreseeable future.16 As train connections rely wholly on Chinese state subsidies, 
this effectively excludes Ukraine from the process. Political factors may also play a role, as Kyiv’s own initiatives 
to bypass Russia, including pilot trains through the Black Sea and Caspian Sea sea-rail transport corridors, have 
not received any significant support from the Chinese side.  
 
Belarus, on the other hand, has gradually become a pivotal country within China’s freight train project. All current 
rail cargo flows, about 150,000 containers in 2016 (with an estimated threefold increase by 2020), pass through 
Belarus. Consequently, any event that could destabilize the Belarus transit route, including potentially hostile 
Russian activities, could result in serious drawbacks to China’s freight train project.  
 
Another side-effect of the rail connections created under the Belt and Road Initiative has been an increased 
readiness on the part of China to accept Belarus’ membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU). However, Russia’s approach towards the EAEU, which currently bears closer resemblance to a new 
political tool for Moscow than a genuine economic cooperation organization, and the current development of 
the regulatory framework within the EAEU, may become more challenging for China in a mid- and long-term 
perspective as it can potentially reduce China’s access to the emerging common market. On the one hand, the 
                                                          
15 Authors’ interview with expert in Beijing, September 2017.  
16 Ibid. 
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fact that Belarus belongs to the EAEU facilitates transit from Kazakhstan via Russia since it removes internal 
borders and bureaucratic barriers. In this manner, the EAEU becomes an opportunity rather than a threat to the 
implementation of long-term Chinese goals. It accords with China’s long-term goal of maintaining access to 
markets and preventing the emergence of potential barriers to the BRI. On the other hand, the establishment of 
the EAEU’s internal market is still work in progress. There are numerous exceptions to internal market freedoms 
and differences between EAEU member states regarding the interpretation of how to implement the adopted 
documents. Bilateral economic disputes between Russia and Belarus (i.e. the recurrent energy disputes between 
Minsk and Moscow on gas prices and crude oil delivery volumes) hamper multilateral cooperation within the 
EAEU. Moreover, sanctions on Russia imposed by the EU as a consequence of Russian aggression against Ukraine 
in 2014-15, as well as counter-sanctions adopted by Moscow, started to create some problems regarding trade 
flows from the EU to China through EAEU member states’ territories. Russia’s customs service is applying a strict 
interpretation regarding the import ban covering certain food products to the Russian domestic market, and has 
extended its scope to include transit through Russian territory. 
 
4.4. Carriers of external policies and target groups 
 
Limited economic investments, in terms of mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investments, as well as 
typical patterns of trade between China and the EaP countries have resulted in China possessing limited influence 
over domestic arrangements within these states. Loans and credit lines have reinforced the existing status quo 
in Belarus, providing Alyaksandr Lukashenko with a source of economic and political support alternative to that 
of Russia and the West. On the other hand, Chinese authorities and companies are fully aware of all the 
difficulties that arise from structural economic problems in Belarus, such as the lack of reforms and its high level 
of economic dependence on Russia.17 Therefore, Beijing is trying to apply tools that are aimed indirectly at 
influencing the Belarusian ruling elite and its internal economic policy. In 2016, during Lukashenko’s visit to 
Beijing, leaders of both countries decided to establish the Chinese-Belarusian Analytical Centre for Development 
(NASB 2016). This state think tank, involving both Belarusian and Chinese experts, is intended to provide the 
Belarusian-Chinese intergovernmental commission with economic analysis in order to boost bilateral economic 
ties. Beijing was planning to open another analytical centre in Minsk, although the results of this have not been 
seen yet.18 It is very likely that the Chinese authorities, who are very much interested in strengthening bilateral 
cooperation within the Belt and Road Initiative, will use soft power tools to promote the Chinese economic model 
and ultimately influence the Belarusian internal economic agenda.  
 
Due to limited opportunities for conducting active foreign policy, Belarus regards its relationship with China as a 
way out of the trap of excessive dependence on Russia (Dyner 2018). Firstly, in the opinion of Belarusian elites, 
tightening cooperation with China could help to at least partially diversify its foreign policy, export markets and 
foreign investments in the country (Budkevich, 2016). Secondly, however, as much as Russia may be concerned 
about greater Chinese engagement, as for now it has never opposed it bluntly as is the case for Western 
involvement. Finally, Belarusian elites find the Chinese economic model very attractive to follow, since in their 
opinion China has managed to keep the former centralized model of economy management and did not allow 
for the expansion of free market (Chalyy 2014). Due to all these reasons, Belarus actively strives for contact with 
                                                          
17 Authors’ interview with expert in Beijing, September 2017. 
18 Ibid. 
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China, even though it understands that Beijing offers rather adverse investment terms, avoiding greenfield 
investment in the Belarusian economy and preferring credit lines that are conditional upon the use of outdated 
Chinese technology and a Chinese labour force.  
 
In the case of Ukraine, however, China’s influence has been negligible. Firstly, this is a result of relatively sparse 
political contacts, especially in comparison to the Chinese-Belarusian political dialogue. Secondly, Ukraine is not 
perceived – at least to date and due to political circumstances and Ukraine’s conflict with Russia – as an important 
country in terms of the development of the Belt and Road initiative, which limits Beijing’s interest towards Kyiv19. 
Thirdly, there are no other strategically important joint economic projects, such as 'The Great Stone' industrial 
park in the case of Belarus. Finally, the internal economic and political reforms launched in Ukraine after 2014, 
concomitant with the deterioration of relations with Russia, go against China’s expectations that the EaP 
countries would pursue a more balanced approach regarding all their foreign partners.     
 
4.5 The impact of China’s economic policies on political systems in Belarus and Ukraine 
 
Differences between China’s economic engagement with Belarus and Ukraine, visible on the level of specific 
policy objectives and tools, affect the potential influence it may have on both countries’ domestic regimes. In 
case of Ukraine, since 2014 China’s economic activity is limited to specific sectors, basically grain imports and 
military technology. With no significant high-level policy dialogue and coordination, the effect China’s actions 
may have on Ukraine’s domestic economic and political structures are marginal. In case of Belarus, on the other 
hand, the intensity of China’s engagement has a potential to modify Belarus’s socio-economic arrangements. 
 
Due to political constraints on Ukraine's role in the BRI, the transit route through Belarus is crucial to the success 
of China’s grand initiative, at least to its core transportation component. A favourable political environment, 
particularly the lack of Russia’s outright opposition and Lukashenko’s top-down economic policy system, and a 
fertile ground for institutional dialogue between Beijing and Minsk, made Belarus an important testing ground 
for China’s model of state-led economic expansion facilitated by a comprehensive bilateral policy coordination. 
Therefore, as an important future industrial base and key transit country, Belarus’ economic openness has 
become China’s long-term policy goal – a partner, with whom China can potentially share it’s reform and 
opening-up experience.20 This is currently facilitated by two important developments: the establishment of the 
Great Stone free trade zone, as well as Minsk’s involvement in multilateral talks aimed at lowering trade barriers 
and cross-border transports for the EU-China railway connections. China is also aiming to share its own reform 
and opening up experiences, promoting reforms through a joint research institution established in Minsk, as well 
as extensive dialogue between economic bureaucracies. It needs to be noted, however, that due to Belarus’s 
institutional constraints and sluggish economy, as well as the lack of a coherent approach from the Chinese side, 
the institutional cooperation remains constrained.21   
 
As stated in the theoretical section, China’s institutional support for the economic development, competition 
and openness may lead Belarus towards a different type of LAO. In other words, China’s engagement may 
                                                          
19 Authors’ interview with expert in Beijing, September 2017. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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support a slow evolution of Belarus’ political system, from a balanced closure LAO towards an unbalanced closure 
LAO and, as a result, affect its future economic development. It should be noted, however, that the course of 
economic reforms promoted by China does not correspond with the one advocated by the EU, but is rather based 
on its own experiences. It tries to foster economic efficiency by stimulating market competition and opening-up 
to the global economy, but leaving the state as a dominant actor in the economy. Importantly, China rejects any 
links between economic and political openness. To the contrary, it openly opposes any policies aiming to do so, 
both domestically and abroad, with the criticism towards the EU’s policy towards Ukraine serving as an example. 
This leads to the conclusion that although China’s engagement with Minsk may promote some degree of 
economic openness in Belarus, thus promoting the move to a more unbalanced state of the Belarusian LAO, it 
may not necessarily lead Belarus to an OAO. If political constrains were lifted, China’s increased economic 





With no immediate goals to alter the existing political status quo in Eastern Europe, China remains an external 
actor whose influence on EaP countries varies from neutrality to partial, albeit not necessarily intentional support 
for LAOs in EaP countries. If governing coalitions in EaP countries were reinforced by China’s growing economic 
presence, thus further limiting the political access, it would rather be a by-product of China’s grand strategies 
that reach beyond the EaP region, and its own predominantly economic interests. Moreover, China’s policy 
towards the EaP countries is most relevant in the realm of economy and trade, while its influence over other 
areas – energy, security and migration – remains negligible. A number of factors have contributed to these 
features of China’s policy towards the region. Firstly, Beijing as a rule opposes any revolutionary change in 
domestic politics, recognizing incumbent governments as legitimate. Secondly, China’s interests towards EaP 
countries are relatively narrow and sectoral, primarily in the economic realm. The major exception is Belarus and 
Ukraine’s (until the Maidan in 2014) participation in the BRI. However, as the Ukraine crisis illustrated the fragility 
of Chinese interests, it has only reinforced the tendency to prioritize stability over change. However, China has 
demonstrated its flexibility and readiness to accept change once it has taken place, as proved by the new model 
of Sino-Ukrainian relations in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution. 
 
The only exception, whereby China’s policy might be considered conducive to supporting the evolution and 
maturing of a LAO, would be Belarus. Given China’s interest in increasing its economic presence and propelling 
economic reforms ‘with Chinese characteristics’, as well as the current Belarussian restrictions on the economic 
access (in many respects, stronger than China’s22), this may actually bring more economic openness. However, 
at least in the short term, it will most likely push Belarus towards an unbalanced closure LAO, with slightly 
increased political openness and political restrictions still in place. This is due to China’s acceptance of incumbent 
governments (derived from its general foreign policy goals), as well as Beijing’s indirect support for Russia’s 
actions that counter other power’s (including the EU) support for a political reform in Eastern Partnership 
countries. In the case of Ukraine, although Beijing has developed a new model of cooperation with Kyiv since 
                                                          
22 According to the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Belarusian index of economic transformation was 5.11 in 2018, 
while China’s was 6.75 (BTI 2018). 
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2014, it contains no strong policy coordination component. Therefore, its impact on Ukraine’s domestic socio-
economic structure remains marginal.   
 
Based on the empirical findings of this paper, a number of recommendations can be drawn for the EU’s future 
engagement with China within the Eastern Partnership region, as well as the EU’s general goals toward the EaP 
countries. As China’s presence is limited in scope, mostly to trade and investment in finance, the economy will 
most probably remain the key issue in this regard. As stated above, China’s economic policy towards the region 
promotes a transformation towards an unbalanced closure LAO. Unlike the EU, it does not link economic 
cooperation with the promotion of political openness. In general, this may undermine the EU’s power and ability 
to promote political openness in the region through economic and financial conditionality. However, by 
maintaining dialogue with EaP countries and highlighting the potential risks linked with China’s economic offers, 
the EU can counter potentially negative tendencies. In some instances, the regional pro-trade and pro-openness 
drive linked with the BRI strategy and China’s economic presence could be channelled to support the EU’s general 
goals in the region. 
 
Firstly, China's financial expansion in the EaP region, in form of preferential loans aimed at infrastructure 
development, should be considered as a threat to the further opening of EaP economies. Unlike multilateral 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) present in the region, such as the World Bank or EBRD, China's debt-
based infrastructure financing model is based on non-competitive biddings, no transparency and lack of proper 
labour and environmental standards. This may potentially drive EaP countries away from the OAO, promoting 
corruption and collusion among existing powerful groups (such as oligarchs). The EU should highlight potential 
macroeconomic risks coming from China's debt-based model to EaP countries, promoting the use of multilateral 
IFIs' funding. Apart from that, a financial counter offer coming from EU institutions (especially through loans 
extended by the European Investment Bank) could provide EAP countries with a viable alternative to Chinese 
funds. As some EaP countries (such as Belarus) are already aware of the low attractiveness of the Chinese offer 
and somehow disillusioned with it, there is a considerable demand for the EU to be more active in this area. 
 
In terms of the EaP's overall trade openness, China should be considered as a potential partner for the further 
opening of EaP countries' economies. China's general economic agenda towards the region includes facilitating 
investments (treating the EaP countries as a potential production base in Europe), as well as increasing the EaP 
countries’ capacity to transit and handle EU-China railway trade. Some of the norms and practices China has tried 
to introduce (such as non-competitive bidding procedures and limited access to the infrastructure built along the 
Belt and Road) may reinforce LAOs in the region and should be countered by relevant EU institutions expanding 
their own policy tools aimed at promoting EU norms and practices. However, Beijing's attempts to develop 
transport corridors going through the EaP region, such as by streamlining custom procedures or reducing non-
tariff barriers, may contribute to a general opening of regional economies. This also applies to economic 
instruments such as industrial zones (with the Great Stone in Belarus as an example), where China promotes a 
more open and competitive regulatory environment. The EU's primary goal should be to ensure that on a 
technical level, initiatives such as developing greater access to infrastructure, improving customs procedures, 
and tax exemptions, are developed according to EU norms. This means the EU should be promoting competition, 
openness and transparency alongside these initiatives, thus utilizing China's pro-trade drive in the region to 
ensure its long term evolution towards greater openness. 
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The EU and Eastern Partnership Countries 
An Inside-Out Analysis and Strategic Assessment 
Against the background of the war in Ukraine and the rising 
tensions with Russia, a reassessment of the European 
Neighborhood Policy has become both more urgent and 
more challenging. Adopting an inside-out perspective on the 
challenges of transformation the Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
countries and the European Union face, the research project 
EU-STRAT seeks to understand varieties of social orders in 
EaP countries and to explain the propensity of domestic 
actors to engage in change. EU-STRAT also investigates how 
bilateral, regional and global interdependencies shape 
domestic actors’ preferences and scope of action. Featuring 
an eleven-partner consortium of academic, policy, and 
management excellence, EU-STRAT creates new and 
strengthens existing links within and between the academic 
and the policy world on matters relating to current and future 
relations with EaP countries. 
